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Abstract
Is it possible to export democracy by force? This article deals with this question 
as applied to the NATO/U.S. military intervention in Libya, in 2011, during the 
Arab- Spring uprisings and its aftermath. We will test and refine the Foreign 
Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) model using the qualitative methods of case 
study and process-tracing. By doing this, we will be able to identify independent 
variables not anticipated by the FIRC model, unveiling the actual, extraordinarily 
complex social-political cleavages of the country that hinder democratization 
and conduce to civil war.
Resumo
É possível exportar democracia pelo uso da força? Este artigo refere-se a essa 
questão, tomando como caso empírico a intervenção militar da OTAN/Estados 
Unidos no Líbano durante os levantes da Primavera Árabe em 2011 e seu 
seguimento. Propomo-nos a testar e refinar o modelo da Foreign Imposed 
Regime Change – FIRC utilizando os métodos qualitativos de estudo de caso 
e process tracing. Tais métodos permitem identificar variáveis independentes 
não antecipadas pelo modelo FIRC, desvendando as reais e complexas clivagens 
sócio-políticas do país que inibem a democratização e abrem caminho para a 
guerra civil.
Keywords: Libya; Arab Spring; NATO/US military intervention; Foreign-Imposed 
Regime Change (FIRC); Libyan Civil War; Militias; Tribes.
Palavras-chave: Líbia; Primavera Árabe; Intervenção militar da OTAN/Estados 
Unidos; Mudança de Regime Imposta por Estrangeiros; Tribos; Milícia.
Introduction
In the year 2011, Libya participated in the uprising of the Arab Spring against its decades-old dictatorship ruled by Khadhafi and 
fought for a new and pluralized regime. The country successfully 
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took down the old regime, with the international assistance of the U.S., leading NATO forces, and 
quickly built transitional democratic institutions. In a short period, political parties emerged, elections 
were in progress, and politicians were drafting a new constitution, all this in a society that has had 
no prior experience with a democratic regime. Nevertheless, in the year 2014, civil war erupted in 
the Libyan territory leading to political chaos.
This paper will analyze how the transitional government backfired to a civil war, referring 
to the Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) literature. FIRC points out the main factors for a 
successful foreign military intervention towards regime change: previous democratic experience, an 
adequate level of economic development, ethnic and religious homogeneity at the target countries 
level, and an institutional type of intervention by the intervener.
The paper intends to refine the findings of the FIRC literature, which utilizes quantitative 
methods of analysis, by making use of qualitative tools – case study and process tracing. The case-study 
method requires good in-depth knowledge of the cases (YIN, 1994). Process tracing is a within-case 
method to trace sequential processes and establish intervenient variables. Rather than aiming to 
control independent variables and isolate the effect of each one on the dependent variable, following 
the logic of regression analysis, process-tracing takes into consideration the combined effect of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable (cf. COLLIER, 2011; GEORGE & BENNETT, 2005).
Through a case study and process tracing, we seek to identify the main actors and analyze their 
political interrelation and actions, to unveil the process of transition and its rupture into civil war. 
Beyond the FIRC’s variables, we will focus on the role of tribes and militias in this process. The Libyan 
society is mainly based on tribal structures, and tribal relations are a pivotal point in the politics and 
economics of the region. Tribal ties have always been present in Libyan politics and were used by 
incumbents as a political instrument to maneuver the government’s interests. Militias have been part of 
political life, especially in Khadhafi’s time, who encouraged citizens to arm themselves. Their number 
skyrocketed during the Arab Spring. We will also regard religious homogeneity beyond the Muslim 
branches, such as Sunnis and Shias, but, instead, as (radical) jihadists and (moderate) non-jihadists.
The paper will be divided into two sections. The first one will examine the FIRC model of 
analysis and its variables while applying it to Libya. The second section will approach how the 
tribal structure, the militias, their links with the cities, and the religious split between jihadists and 
non-jihadists influenced the 2014 civil war, and why they should be considered essential variables 
to explain civil unrest.
Foreign Imposed Regime Change 
The Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) 1 literature analyzes military-imposed regime 
change and indicates necessary independent variables so the intervener could promote regime change. 
1 For a good revision of the FIRC literature, see Castro Santos and Teixeira (2017).
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Castro Santos and Teixeira (2017), after analyzing the different FIRC’s definitions offered by 
various authors of this literature, came to the following main characteristics of those definitions:
(1) the removal by an external actor of autocratic leaders and/or autocratic political 
institutions by the use of force; (2) the imposition by an external actor of a new leader or 
the restoration of a recently overthrown ruler to office; (3) the playing by the intervening 
external actor of an important role in the establishment, promotion, and maintenance of 
a new democratic political system in the target state. (p. 6)
 We here adopt the same definition indicated in Castro Santos and Teixeira (2017): “…we will 
consider a democratic FIRC the external intervention that includes at least the first characteristic 
listed above” (p. 6).
Downes and Monten (2013) tested the main findings and hypotheses of the leading authors of 
this literature, offering a final model of internal and external variables conducive to successful regime 
change. These authors’ focus was on the intervention results in altering the leaders of the countries 
and building new democratic institutions, as well as on the country’s transition to a consolidated 
democracy. They analyzed a significant number of interventions aiming for regime change during 
the 20th century and even as early as in the 19th century. “Each of these studies contains more than 
1,000 cases of intervention (p. 101).” Downes and Monten (2013) concluded, however, that the use of 
military force has not been deemed historically successful. The observed countries, which experienced 
FIRC, seldom demonstrated little democratic change, not being able to have a successful transition to 
a consolidated democracy. On the contrary, most of those countries remained autocratic (DOWNES 
& MONTEN, 2013, p. 100-103).
Downes and Monten established internal and external variables to analyze the chances of a 
successful democratic transition. Their model’s internal variables refer to specific conditions of 
the target countries at the time of intervention, which affects the forced regime change to succeed 
or fail in implementing a democratic government. They are good economic prosperity, ethnic and 
religious homogeneity, and previous experience with democracy. The external variable is the type of 
intervention conducted by the foreign actor, associated with the intervener’s actions in implementing 
the regime change. Two types of interventions are identified: the leadership intervention, when only 
the autocratic leader is removed, allowing the population to build a new regime by itself; and the 
institutional intervention, when besides ousting the authoritarian leader from power, the intervener 
actively participates in the crafting of new democratic institutions. Only the second type is considered 
conducive to democratization.
Chart 1. The FIRC Model
Economic Prosperity Ethnic and Religious Fragmentation
Previous Democratic 
Experience Type of Intervention
Low (–)
High (+)
Heterogeneity (–) 
Homogeneity (+)
No (-)
Yes (+)
Leadership (–) 
Institutional (+)
Source: Based on Downes and Monten (2013).
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Chart 1 on FIRC’s variables will analyze which of them were present in Libya before the 2011 
uprising and which type of intervention the foreign interveners implemented.
Libya’s FIRC
The External Variable
Leadership Type of Intervention. A variable deemed essential to understanding why Libya 
transition was not successful is the type of intervention opted by the Obama administration – that 
of the leadership type. According to Downes and Monten (2013, p. 106), in this type of leadership, 
the intervener removes the state’s primary leader but does not enforce democratic institutions and 
selection procedures. The authors defend that this type of intervention is unlikely to stimulate any 
democratic change.
In 2011, Libyans initiated the uprising against the regime, and Colonel Khadhafi commanded 
to repress the civilians that protested against his rule violently. The international community noticed 
such brutality, and the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 to enforce a no-fly zone and 
protect civilians.
The Obama administration was initially hesitant in intervening in the country. However, the 
United States accepted to lead NATO forces to implement the UNSC resolution and, going beyond 
the resolution mandate, proceeded to oust Khadhafi from power. Contradicting previous
U.S. President Obama believed that the Libyan people should choose their leaders and build 
their institutions. Thus, his administration contacted the moderate group of Muslim rebels and 
assisted them in taking down the Colonel. In October 2011, the rebels were able to depose Khadhafi 
with international support, eventually being free to create their institutions and select their leaders.
The authority that the Obama administration opted to support was the National Transitional 
Council (NTC), which quickly emerged in February 2011, days after the uprising. As indicated 
above, the United States led the ousting of Muhammar Khadhafi from power, but did not remain to 
directly build new institutions, deciding the strategy of “leading from behind.” By this strategy, the 
U.S. indirectly pressured the NTC and the moderate rebels they were assisting in creating democratic 
institutions (cf. CASTRO SANTOS & TEIXEIRA, 2014 and 2017). The U.S also counted on European 
allies to aid the Libyan transition. However, such partners showed little initiative for the task at hand 
(FRIEDMAN, 2014).
Another critical United States’ intervention in Libya was in 2016 when it heeded to the request 
of the recently established UN-backed Parliament to comply with the Libyan Political Agreement 
(LPA) put up in 2015. The Agreement is a U.N. deal signed by warring factions, which sought to 
accommodate the existing rival Parliaments – the Government of National Salvation (GNS) and the 
House of Representatives (HoR) – into one unified Parliament and government. The Presidency 
Council (P.C.),2 created by the LPA, requested the U.S. to assist in combating the Islamic State, 
2 The development of this third power center and its belligerent coexistence with the GNS and HoR will be dealt in more detail in 
the second section of this article.
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which has taken advantage of the instability caused by the 2014 civil war. The Obama administration 
opted to support the UN-backed Parliament and fight terrorism with airstrike campaigns without 
implanting ground forces (“no troops on the ground”).
Although the Libyan people had the freedom to elect their leaders and build their institutions, 
the newly born government struggled in maintaining order and the rule of law in the country. The 
state’s security apparatus was almost nonexistent and highly depended on aligned militias to keep 
control. The armed groups and their complex interrelations with the tribes, the cities, and the Islamist 
groups were an obstacle for the Libyan government to implement stable institutions. Instability was 
installed and eventually led to civil war, with three competing and conflicting power centers.
The Internal Variables
Economic Prosperity. Libya experienced significant profits with oil revenues in the 1973 oil 
crisis. Thanks to the prices boom, Khadhafi had the financial means to fulfill his aspirations for the 
country by exporting the commodity and using the profit gained to develop the country.
Many scholars classify the oil-producing states as rentier states. According to the rentier state 
theory, this kind of state does not collect revenue through the population’s taxation but instead depends 
on externally generated rents (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2014). Luciani (1990) defended that countries 
that rely on oil for at least 40 percent of their economic income are categorized as rentier states. It 
was identified that between 1972 and 1999, Libya had a 58% of financial dependence on oil revenues.
The Khadhafi regime sought to solidify itself in the mid-70s with the Jamahiriya3 system. Because 
the rentier state itself collected oil revenues accumulated abroad, Libya “achieved societal autonomy, 
free to create its clientelist networks by buying allegiance outright instead of negotiating with the 
people” (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2014). Without political participation, this structure of patronage 
became the link between state and society.
However, when the oil prices declined in the 1980s, along with the international sanctions 
imposed on Libya4 and the inefficiency of its bureaucracy, the regime failed to competently create 
and establish policies to confront the global oil crisis in the 90s. The state’s institutional incapacity 
combined with Khadhafi’s fear of losing power to hinder the implementation of needed reform 
policies (BENLI ALTUNISIK, 2014).
At the time of the uprising in 2011, Libya had survived the Western trade embargo and the 
oil crisis. Among his attempts to halt Libya’s economic downfall, Khadhafi opened its economy and 
introduced measures to liberalize it. Consequently, Libya’s economic situation gradually improved. 
The country’s GDP was 87.14 billion U.S. dollars in 2008, and in 2010, the GDP per capita was almost 
12,000 USD (WORLD BANK, 2011). Whereas, during multilateral sanctions (1992 to 1999), the 
country’s GDP per capita most significant downfall was $5,717 in 1995 (UN DATA, 2010).
3 The Jamahiriyya was a political system marked by consultation, rather than representation, which aimed at restructuring the 
political, economic, and social relations associated to a distributive state.
4 Libya’s involvement in several terrorist acts subjected the country to an extension of US unilateral sanctions and of United Nations 
multilateral sanctions.
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Meanwhile, only the elite benefited from the economic situation. In fact, in the year of 2010, the 
unemployment rate was still as high as 18.4% (ILO, 2016) and jobs with low wages were widespread, 
the inflation rate reached 14.16% (WORLD BANK), and there was a significant degree of inequality 
due to the clientelist policies adopted by the regime5.
All in all, we can say that by the time of the Arab Spring outburst, Libya enjoyed a certain 
amount of economic prosperity. This variable could then be considered to reach a medium-low value 
in terms of the FIRC model.
Previous Democratic Experience. Another preexistent variable considered in FIRC’s literature is 
a democratic experience in the target country before the regime change. The population of Libya did 
not have democratic experience during Khadhafi’s time nor before that. With its strategic geographical 
location in the Mediterranean, Libya has always been other nations’ target and has suffered countless 
invasions during its history. Conquered by different empires, it became an Italian colony in 1912. In 
1942, the Allies controlled the former colony and established independence and a monarchy under 
King Idris al-Sanussi (VANDEWALLE, 2012).
The monarchy suffered a coup d’état in 1969 by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) 
led by Khadhafi, who implanted the Jamahiriya system, aspiring to create a stateless country Libyans 
could govern themselves. However, the Jamahiriyya’s pillars were structured in a way that prevented 
political mobilization. After the attempted 1975 coup, the Arab Socialist Union, a structure of local, 
provincial, and national assemblies, was dismantled. The regime created the General People’s Congress 
(GPC) as a formal platform for citizens to participate in politics. Yet competence and authority were 
limited and restricted to the revolutionaries’ agenda.
The regime maintained stability by controlling the economy and distributing economic benefits, 
so political silence became a must-have. Khadhafi was “able to prevent a coalescing of political interests 
based on purely economic resources” (VANDEWALLE, 2012, p. 128). Thus, especially the Libyan 
elite absorbed the benefits of the oil economy but politically stood cowed and silent. Meanwhile, 
those who were not associated with the government were marginalized economically and politically 
and eventually repressed.
In the years before the 2011 uprising, Khadhafi promised more political freedom to improve 
Libya’s status in the international community. However, political rights and civil liberties remained 
restricted, and political parties and freedom of assembly were still deemed illegal. Before the uprising, 
2010 Libya’s Freedom Rating, Civil Liberties, and Political Rights were all classified as 7, the worst 
rating a country could receive (FREEDOM HOUSE, 2011).
Although Muhammar Khadhafi defended that its people should govern Libya and aspired to 
mobilize its population politically, the country was managed according to the autocratic leader’s plan. 
Political participation was made impossible by the Jamahiriya system. Thus, the Libyan population 
had no previous democratic experience before the NATO intervention. Regarding the FIRC model, 
in Libya’s case, it will be considered as unfavorable.
5 A GINI coefficient during the Khadhafi era in the 2000’s for Libya is not available.
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Ethnic and Religious Homogeneity. The prominent ethnic identity of today’s Libya is the Arabs/
Berbers. More than 90% of Libyans identify themselves as Arab or an ethnic mix of Arab and Berber. 
At the same time, the rest of the population belongs to other ethnicities, the nomadic Tuaregs, and 
the Tehbu tribes in the south, and the Berbers Amazighs (USAIP, 2012).
The dominant ethnicity, Arab/Berbers, is concentrated in certain cities and regions. The leading 
Arab cities of current Libya include Tripoli, Benghazi, Misrata, Zawiya, Sabrata, Khums, al-Bayda, 
Darna, Tobruk. The Berber/Amazigh minority, who have not entirely adapted to Arab culture, are 
mainly found in the western region, in the coastal areas of Zuwara and the Nafusa/Western Mountains 
(cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes and Islamists, 2014). The Tuaregs, composed of black indigenous 
tribes located in southern Libya, are concentrated in Kufra and Sabha. The Tehbu population originates 
from oil-rich provinces and lucrative trafficking and transit routes from sub-Saharan Africa to the 
Mediterranean North (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014).
The non-Arab ethnicities, along with the Berbers Amazighs minority, were marginalized during 
the Khadhafi regime. Not surprisingly, these ethnicities took arms against the autocratic leader 
during the 2011 uprising.
Libya also possesses a high level of religious homogeneity. The Arab conquests and migration 
in the fifth and seventh centuries eventually spread Islam in North Africa. Moreover, 96,6% of the 
current population of Libya is Muslim Sunnis (CIA World Factbook).
Social fragmentation is crucial in understanding political cleavages in the target countries because 
it frequently leads to civil war. Libya, however, at first sight, seems to be ethnically and religiously 
homogeneous. Which divides were then responsible for the irruption of civil war?
To begin with, there is a deep division among the Sunni Muslims. Despite Islamist groups have 
existed since the monarchy, the tension between Islamists and non-Islamists, or secularists, became 
palpable with the uprisings due to power disputes (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 
2014). We cannot say, therefore, that Libya is characterized by religious homogeneity, and we cannot 
say either that the FIRC’s ethnic-religious fragmentation variable is positive in the case of Libya.
Moreover, the dispute for power between tribes, militias, cities, Islamists, and non-Islamists 
tells a significant part of the story. Those are variables not taken into consideration by the FIRC 
literature. In the next section, we will analyze those aspects in more detail.
As shown below, in Chart 2, Libya would not be a successful case of democratization, according 
to the FIRC model (DOWNES & MOTEN, 2013). This model states that none of the four variables 
indicated should be absent. In the Libyan case, the leadership type of intervention and the lack of 
democratic experience should work against democratization. Economic prosperity reached a certain 
level but favored only the political elite. The high ethnic-religious homogeneity would then be the 
only FIRC variable present in Libya that would work against civil war. We indicated above, however, 
that the religious homogeneity was only apparent.
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Chart 2. THE FIRC Model Applied to Libya
Economic Prosperity
Ethnic and Religious 
Homogeneity
Previous Democratic 
Experience
Type of Intervention
 +/–  + – Leadership (–)
We will argue at this point that even if the FIRC model proved right in general terms when it 
comes to Libya, it missed the social-political cleavages that matters: a tribal society, split between 
Islamists and non-Islamists and suffering the increasing impact of armed groups and militias upon 
political stability. To better understand the irruption of civil war in Libya, the next section will 
consider the effect of those variables not considered by the FIRC model.
Libyan socio-political cleavages: tribes, militias, and cities 
Khadhafi’s initial ambitions for Libya at the beginning of the 1969 Revolution, after disposing of 
the Sanussi monarchy, was an Arab nationalist stateless country where the people governed themselves 
and enjoyed political mobility and economic equality. The oil revenues were the leading economic 
component to establish his vision of egalitarianism and development. He desired to take down 
inefficient bureaucracies and weaken tribal and regional elites. However, during the four decades of 
Khadhafi’s regime, the mechanisms that maintained his rule were patronage and retribalization. The 
dictator co-opted tribes from Tripolitania that were not allied to the monarchy and, through patronage, 
could sustain their loyalty. Those tribes who did have leverage over the others were Khadhafi’s tribes, 
Qadhadhfa, also the Warfalla and the Maqahra. Being loyal to the regime, they held high political 
positions, received economic benefits, and were the backbone of the security apparatus, weakening the 
national army. These strategies to support his regime contradicted his previous goals and marginalized 
tribes from Cyrenaica, which in the past were linked to the monarchy (cf. VANDEVALLE, 2012).
An informal organization in the Jamahiriyya that served as a security mechanism was the 
People’s Social Leadership Committees. The Committees consisted of heads of families or prominent 
individuals loyal to the regime. Their purpose was to help maintain social stability by controlling 
members of tribes and families aligned to the government. This Committee system was a powerful 
instrument that was used by the regime to balance the political system. 
Through these Committees, the tribes’ political function was able to get formalized and represent 
tribal interests. In these platforms, tribal leaders were responsible for the subversive behaviors of their 
tribe members. Meanwhile, political mobilization across tribal divides, through political parties or 
civil society organizations, remained illegal. Moreover, “state formation, urbanization, and economic 
transformation had, in many ways, perpetuated tribal loyalties rather than undermined them. The 
disruptive nature of Libyan state formation allowed individuals to remain loyal to their tribes” 
(LACHER, 2011, p. 4).
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It is crucial at this point to understand the tribal role in Libyan society. Although tribalization 
diminished, tribal ties continued part of Libyan identity. Tribal identities represent a collective sense 
of thinking and acting in the country (VARVELLI, 2013).
Tribes, families, and cities complexly intertwined themselves in urban areas, supporting either 
Khadhafi’s regime or the rebels. According to Lacher (2011):
(…) urbanization saw communities settle in cities according to parentage, with close 
relatives settling nearest to each other. While this pattern inevitably faded over the past 
decades, it remained sufficiently strong for districts of major cities to side with the regime 
or the revolutionaries, depending on the tribal community dominating the neighborhood. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to the hinterland, tribal loyalties have historically been weaker 
in cities with a longstanding urban history, including Tripoli and other towns of the 
western coastal strip and Misrata and Benghazi, where prominent families played a 
leading role. 
Khadhafi also envisioned a country in which individuals were free to arm themselves, encouraging 
tribes to have their military councils and contributing to the national army’s emaciation. Therefore, 
tribes and cities already possessed the experience and armed fighters by the uprising of 2011. Not 
only did Khadhafi loyalists have their militaries, but also other prominent tribes and cities, such 
as Misrata and Benghazi, bore their own armed and experienced personnel. Many had the fighting 
experience even before the Khadhafi era, in disputes to gain colonial freedom and other historical 
wars (see VANDERVALLE, 2012). The fact that these existed during Khadhafi’s regime is essential 
to understand how the tribes and Islamist groups quickly organized many militias after the Arab 
Spring.
By the beginning of 2011, when the Arab Spring uprisings began, negative sentiment towards 
the Khadhafi regime quickly emerged. Those who have been relegated along the four decades of 
the Colonel’s reign, tribes from Cyrenaica and Islamist groups, rebelled against his rule and rapidly 
organized a transitional council (the NTC) to make way new form of government. 
The eastern region, one of the marginalized areas by Khadhafi, was the first to initiate the 
uprising and establish a new government alternative. The National Transitional Council (NTC) 
was mostly made up of the descendants of former monarchical elites of Cyrenaica. During the 
revolt, many military and tribal leaders created means to protect their own against the repressive 
acts of the regime to control the rebels. Those were the leaders also responsible for creating the 
NTC.
Local councils and armed militia groups began to arise throughout the other regions of the 
country to contest the Khadhafi rule on a city-by-city basis. This movement mainly emerged from 
pre-existing groups within the Libyan society, based on regionalism, tribe, locality, and ideology 
(LACHER, 2014). Throughout the uprising, those small units evolved into military brigades and 
councils to, along with individual military and tribal leaders, protect the population and cities against 
the regime.
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The NTC quickly emerged in Benghazi and soon relocated to Tripoli, operating as the official 
national government. However, it struggled to maintain legitimacy and control over the Libyan 
territory while the innumerous s armed groups followed their agendas. Meanwhile, with U.S. leading 
NATO foreign military assistance, rebels could arm themselves, including having access to the former 
government’s weapon stocks when Khadhafi’s security sectors collapsed.
Due to the NTC’s inability to execute territorial control over the country, the local militias took 
up the task. They established their authority upon their regions or cities of origin, as an informal 
option to implement order until the creation of new institutions and a new constitution. In the 
beginning, the militias focused on securing territorial control and did not yet possess a clear political 
agenda (LACHER, 2014). However, when the militias and armed groups became more robust and 
more influential after the fall of the former regime, they, as indicated, started acting upon their 
interests and agendas.
Another type of armed group found in Libya, which has its roots in ideology, is the Islamist 
militias. An Islamist is a member of an ideological movement devotee who desires Islam to dictate 
through sharia all aspects of society, from the economy, politics, and culture, to social relationships 
(cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). Those adherents to this radical ideology aim 
to establish a theocratic Islamic state.
Radical jihadi cells were first created in the 1970s and were ignited by Afghanistan vs. Soviet 
War. The veterans for Jihad against the USSR later opposed Kaddafi’s injustices, creating the largest 
opposition group, the former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Not surprisingly, this opposition 
group triggered massive repression from the Khadhafi government. In the late 1990s, the government 
initiated negotiations for reconciliation and to cease violence. As a result, many were released from 
prison in the early 2000s, and several of them were critical for the success of the 2011 uprising and 
eventually participated in the political transition. Thus, the former LIFG members formed political 
parties, ran in elections, and served in prominent political positions in government. However, the 
younger generation of jihadists did not agree with the participation of these former LIFG members 
in the transition process. They possessed a more radical ideology and categorized democracy as 
un-Islamic (FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016).
One should note that the Islamists were not the ones who initiated the uprising, yet they took 
an essential part in the conflict. Most of the militias that fought in the rebellion had an Islamist 
and/or Jihadi background. Although they were not able or willing to build institutional support and 
efficient organizational structures or institutions, the Islamist groups succeed in Libya’s political 
scene. They were, at first, the only political force with a national plan, different from the rest of the 
local political actors in Libya.
The NTC eventually resigned in November 2011, and a new interim cabinet – the General 
National Congress (GNC) –, incorporated members of other regional and tribal militias and was 
responsible for establishing elections for a new political body – the House of Representatives (HoR) 
– that would elaborate a new constitution. The new interim cabinet, the GNC, made it possible for 
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tribal institutions to be represented in the new democratic framework, representing their interests. 
In this way, tribal leaders had access to national decisions and were no longer mediators of only the 
regional and local levels.
Although the new cabinet allowed more representation, some tribes were excluded due to 
their past allegiance to the Khadhafi regime and faced persecution since the uprising. In May 2013, 
a political-exclusion law passed, which prevented individuals associated with Khadhafi to enter 
public life. Also, minorities protested for more cultural inclusion in the new constitution (FREEDOM 
HOUSE, 2014).
Meanwhile, the GNC, like the first transitional political body – the NTC – also faced 
difficulty establishing territorial control and securing the country from local extremist groups. 
These jihadists radical groups, located mainly in the Gulf of Sirte and in the northeast region, 
tried to weaken tribal ties, reiterating a common bond of Islam among all Libyans. By their turn, 
the tribes, in general, contributed to affirming a traditional vision of Islam, but a moderate one, 
diverging from extremist views. Therefore, the tribal system can be considered the most reliable 
counterweight to radicalism. This moderate tribes’ role has caused cleavages between radicals and 
tribes on the more legitimate law (urf vs. sharia)6. Radical powers, moreover, tried to undermine the 
traditional tribal role, warning against nepotism and favoritism as anti-Islamic results of tribalism 
(VARVELLI, 2013).
With the 2012 election for the representatives promoted by the GNC, militias gradually 
gained strength, given the support they had from politicians’ members of this interim body and 
other prominent political forces. Libya’s main political parties, created after the uprisings, at 
the time did not have their armed groups, so they affiliated themselves with militias based on 
kin, region, and tribe, as well as religious and ideological differences (cf. Report Libya: Militias, 
Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). The political parties themselves were constituted by tribal, regional, 
and religious affiliation. This led to the creation of numerous political parties. However, only a 
handful of parties had candidates across the country, such as the Muslim Brotherhood Justice 
and Construction Party and the Salafist Al-Watan party (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & BARR, 
2015).
Patronage and exclusion bounded the armed groups with political actors, just like Khadhafi’s 
political tactics in the old regime. Libyan politicians drew alliances from militias to advance their 
agendas, and militias secured politicians and ministries to assure their power. Many militias 
and politicians settled scores, marginalized, and isolated the remnants of the Khadhafi era. 
An example of such behavior was the above mentioned Political-Exclusion Law of 2013, which 
targeted officials who had served the Khadhafi regime. (cf. Report Libya: Militias, Tribes, and 
Islamists, 2014).
6 Urf is the known term for the communal law established by the tribal system in Libya. Sharia is the religious law of the Koran.
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Chart 3. The Building-up of the Civil War
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In February 2014, Libya held national elections for a Constituent Assembly, which would draft 
a new constitution and municipal council elections in April. Besides, the GNC was expected to 
transfer its power to the elected House of Representatives (HoR) in the middle of the year. As was 
mentioned before, during this transition period, many tribes created alliances among themselves. 
The region of Cyrenaica, which was politically marginalized by the former regime, pledged tribal 
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alliances to Khadhafi’s era exiled-general Khalifa Haftar. Through this alliance, the Libyan National 
Army (LNA) was created as a coalition of tribal and militias which supported Haftar. The general 
led an operation in May 2014, known as Operation Dignity, which sought to eradicate Islamists and 
tribes that were once affiliated to the former regime.
Along with the LNA, militia forces from Benghazi fought in Operation Dignity. Haftar argued 
that Islamists overran the GNC and that many politicians were linked to Islamist militias (cf. Report 
Libya: Militias, Tribes, and Islamists, 2014). Because of the Operation, the GNC agreed to eliminate 
party lists and forced all candidates to run as independents (GARTENSTEIN-ROSS & BARR, 2015). 
This weakened the already frail political party system.
In the following month, as a response to Operation Dignity, the coalition known as Libya 
Dawn was formed. It was constituted of both Islamist and secularist militias, factions from Tripoli 
and Misrata, and other places in western Libya, and included members from the Amazigh minority. 
The tension between the two groups scaled up a month before the June 2014 elections for the 
new HoR parliament. Violent clashes followed up, and consequentially few people showed up for 
the polls. The results were unfavorable for the Islamists groups, and they soon contested the results 
(FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016). Tripoli, the site of the GNC and where the polls took place, was 
soon invaded by militias who opposed the election’s result, which led the elected Parliament of the 
HoR to take refuge in the eastern city of Tobruk. Meanwhile, the Islamist militias remerged the old 
GNC and later renamed it the Government of National Salvation (GNS). In mid-2014, Libya found 
itself in a civil war with two parliaments, each one claiming to be the rightful authority in the country.
Even though the international community recognized the more secularist HoR as the elected and 
official authority, Libya remained decentralized and stateless. Searching for a solution to the chaos, in 
December 2015, an UN-backed government was borne out of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), 
known as the Presidential Council (P.C.). The P.C. was created to act as the central authority and 
supreme commander of the armed forces. Its base was in Tripoli. The intention was for the P.C. to 
preside over the Government of National Accord (GNA), the unified government, where the GNS was 
to become a consultative body and the HoR, the legislative body (FITZGERALD & TOALDO, 2016).
The GNS eventually lost control over relevant institutions along with the civil war. Most of 
the members of the GNS transitioned to the State Council, one of the consultative bodies under the 
LPA. However, the group that has caused more difficulty in accepting the P.C. as the primary and 
sole authority in Libya was the group of politicians based in Tobruk and al-Bayda, because they 
refused to cooperate with Islamist groups. Thus, both sides put significant obstacles for the unified 
government: on the one hand, by the HoR’s concerns about GNS politicians’ links to Islamist militias 
and, on the other, by the GNS allies demand the exclusion of the Libyan National Army of General 
Khalifa Haftar from the new government (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2017).
Moreover, the HoR, which was to become the legitimate legislative authority under the Agreement, 
failed to pass a valid constitutional amendment to establish its jurisdiction. Instead, it opted to endorse 
the rival government of Abdullah al-Thinni, which operates from the eastern Libyan city of al-Bayda. 
Both towns of Tobruk and al-Bayda are controlled by the anti-Islamist general Khalifa Haftar, who 
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led the 2014’s Operation Dignity and is still in command of the Libyan National Army (LNA). Since 
then, the HoR has continuously rejected the government proposed by the P.C. (FITZGERALD & 
TOALDO, 2016).
With the country divided into three parliaments, the thousands of active militias in Libya have 
aligned themselves with one of such parliaments, even though the military councils act upon their 
interests and agenda. The country is split between Islamists, secularists, and those in favor of the 
UN-backed Parliament, which intends to unify the fractured nation. 
In February 2015, thanks to the country’s security instability and failure to establish law and 
order, the Islamic State, also known as Daesh, encountered a haven to settle its presence in the 
coastal city of Sirte in February 2015 (COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 2017). Throughout 
the year of 2015, ISIS continued to conquer critical checkpoints in Libya. In May 2015, it seized the 
al-Qardabiya Air Base and the Great Man-Made River irrigation complex. Moreover, ISIS proceeded 
to carry out executions, strictly control of Libyan media and internet, and impose physical penalties 
to those who opposed the regime (BECCARO, 2020).
Consequently, the GNA, backed by the United States., launched offensives to recapture territories 
seized by the Islamic State (BECCARO, 2020, p. 11). By the end of 2016, local armed groups, along 
with U.S. air and drone strikes – a campaign requested by the UN-backed parliament–, mostly 
removed Daesh fighters from the city of Sirte, the main territory the organization held until then. 
The jihadist organization, however, maintained its presence in other areas of Libya.
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In fact, in 2018, Tripoli suffered three attacks by the Islamic State, such as to keep substantial 
insecurity and lack of confidence in the country’s structures, notably those dominated by the GNA 
and the LNA (TRAUTHIG, 2020). In 2019, ISIS began to focus its activities in Southern Libya, 
frequently attacking LNA checkpoints, such as Zillah and Qatron (TRAUTHIG, 2020). Consequently, 
in September of this year, the United States carried out several airstrikes targeted at the ISIS bases 
in Southern Libya (The New York Times, September 2019).
Today, the Islamic State is still operating in the country. It manifests itself via special attacks 
on institutions connected to the state and on less prominent but more frequent activities in desert 
regions (TRAUTHIG, 2020, p. 19). 
Meanwhile, General Haftar and his forces have enforced control over their stronghold in eastern 
Libya and have been advancing westward since May 2017. After taking over the central oil ports in 
September 2016, the LNA was victorious in Benghazi and established control over the oil infrastructure 
in this region. This victory was completed after a three-year campaign to dominate the city and 
dislodge rival Islamist militias from vital military bases in the country’s central and southwestern 
regions. “Haftar’s ability to navigate Libyan tribal dynamics enabled him to take control of most 
of Libya’s oil infrastructure.” (ESTELLE & PARK, 2017). Haftar’s intolerance of Islamists, however, 
turns out to restrict Libyans’ political options, pushing part of them to seek the support of violent 
Islamist groups.
The United Nations Security Council has declared, in 2018, that regarding the Libyan crisis, its 
top priority was to uphold presidential and parliamentary elections in 2018. Agreements were set up 
between the two prominent leaders of the country, Fayez al Sarraj (GNS) and Khalifa Haftar (LNA). 
Nevertheless, the UN-backed PC was incapable of guaranteeing freedom of assembly and speech and 
of overseeing a safe election, deeming that it was still dependent on local militias for providing its 
security (MIDDLE EAST EYE, 2018). As a result, elections have been postponed since then.
Today, besides the recurrent attacks by the Islamic State, Libya still faces intense internal conflict 
as well. One of the most recent sources of internal instability was the assault in 2019 by General 
Haftar and the LNA to Tripoli, ousting the GNA from the city. Afterward, mass graves were discovered 
in Tarhuna, a territory near Tripoli that worked as a stronghold for Haftar’s forces. In March 2020, 
however, the GNA launched an operation to take Tripoli back from Haftar. Another important source 
of instability in the present dispute over the city of Sirte, once seized by ISIS, between LNA and the 
GNA (UN NEWS, 2020). This city is not only a strategic point but also one of great symbolism since 
it is the birthplace of Muammar Gaddafi. 
Moreover, international influence turns an already complicated situation into an even more 
complex one. According to António Guterres, the United Nations’ current Secretary-General, “the 
conflict has entered a new phase, with foreign interference reaching unprecedented levels, including 
in the delivery of sophisticated equipment and the number of mercenaries involved in the fighting.” 
(UN NEWS, 2020, p. 3). These foreign countries, besides the Western countries, included Russia, 
Egypt, Turkey.
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Overall, fighting continues to fracture Libya, as the various rebel and militia groups have divided 
the country among political, ideological, and tribal lines. The intended unity government has not been 
able to bring together the warring factions and reestablish stability in Libya. The war has generated 
many deaths and human rights violations on both sides, along with a massive flux of refugees. It has 
also cost the country’s oil infrastructure to deteriorate, which is the economic lifeblood of Libya.
Conclusions
The main actors who initiated and persisted in the Libyan Civil War are about the same who 
were marginalized by the Khadhafi regime. After years of repression from the former government, 
the Arab Spring gave to Islamist groups and tribes from the region of Cyrenaica the opportunity to 
actively lead the ousting from power of the oppressive leader and establish a new Libya in which 
they would be in control. The regime change, however, was interrupted by civil war, which prevails 
until today.
Applied to Libya, the Foreign-Imposed Regime-Change model indicates that three of the four 
variables identified as necessary to the democratic institutional building were absent in the country: 
economic prosperity, previous democratic experience, and the institutional type of intervention. In 
this sense, the model proved right.
Notwithstanding, it is worth making some comments on the only variable favorable to 
democratization, present at the time of the foreign military intervention: the very high Libyan 
homogeneity in ethnic and religious terms, more than 90% and almost 97%, respectively, of the total 
population. According to the FIRC model, it is reasonable to suppose that this remarkable homogeneity 
would work against internal conflicts. However, this was not what has happened. 
The qualitative methods of the case study and process tracing applied to the Libyan transitional 
process indicated that there were deep socio-political cleavages in the post-Khadhafi regime not 
anticipated by the existence of a tremendous ethnic-religious homogeneity. To begin with, a closer 
investigation showed that the religious homogeneity was only apparent, despite the 96,6% adherence 
of the Libyan people to the Sunni branch of Islamism. In fact, since the Arab-Spring uprising, the 
population as a whole has been divided between radical Islamists and non-Islamists, which interacted 
with other divides such as the tribal nature of the country, the grievances of tribes put aside by 
Khadhafi, the increasing number of militias and the complex and dynamic interrelation between all 
these variables and the cities. 
The human and material costs of war in Libya are not easy to obtain, partly due to a media 
clampdown by the Libyan government. However, some figures can be provided.
New America, a think tank located in Washington, calculated air, drone, and ground strikes 
against Libya since the US/NATO intervention in the civil war. Various foreign countries (Western 
and non-Western) and local factions (especially the two leading contenders, LNA and GNA) 
operated those strikes. It came to more than 4,600 the number of strikes counted, from 2011 to 
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March 2020. It is worth noting that the bulk of the 550 American strikes (air and drone) since 2012 
were concentrated in the second half of 2016. Those were authorized by Obama’s Presidential Policy 
Guidance (PPG), to destroy ISIS’s stronghold located in the coastal city of Sirte, upon request of the 
Government of National Accord (GNA), the unity government to be (data are from New America and 
Airwars, 2020).
Deaths because of strikes were significant. New America and Airwars data also indicated the 
number of civil deaths, between 637 and 930, and between 1,225 and 1,543, the number of combatants 
deceased during the period 2011-March 2020. Moreover, the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 
reported that civilian casualties (deaths and injuries) increased 45% in the first three months of 2020 
as compared to the last months of the preceding year, due to the recrudescence of war in the previous 
years. In this context, the U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR) calculated in 401,836 the number of Libyans 
internally displaced. In 5,709, the number of vulnerable refugees and asylum seekers departed from 
the country since November 2017.
The effects of war on the Libyan economy were devastating. Before the civil war, Libya produced 
1.8 million barrels of crude oil per day. Between 2004 and 2010, the country’s GDP increased, on 
average of 5.5 per year, reaching US$ 12,064 per capita. After a few months of conflict, however, in 
July 2011, the country’s oil production plummeted to 22,000 barrels per day. As the Libyan economy 
was significantly dependent on oil exports, the GDP annual rate change went down from 2.9 in 2010, 
to -60.0 in 2011, and GDP per capita plummeted to US$ 5,554. The country suffered a deep recession 
during the next three years when oil production was approximately only 0.6 million barrels per day, 
and GDP per capita reached its lowest point since a decade ago, US$ 4,035. However, in the next two 
years, oil production surpassed 1 million barrels per day, and GDP grew around 21%.
Notwithstanding, the recrudescence of war, beginning April 2019 with the recent conflict in 
Tripoli, nearly shut down oil production and exports. Libyan’s GDP per capita in 2019 was US$ 7,700 
(cf. IMF, 2012; World Bank, 2019; World Bank, 2020). Al Shahid, an independent media vehicle that 
monitors the Middle East and North Africa, estimates that the damages and closures of the oil fields 
provoked losses around 130 billion dollars, and oil theft reached 1 million dollars each year, oil being 
the bulk of the Libyan economy.
In the face of these vast materials and human costs, international aid for development reached 
merely US$ 303 million (USAID, 2020).
Despite those massive costs in the Libyan war and the NATO/ US and their allies’ efforts, they 
could not stop the civil war and much less improve the democracy indexes of the country. In fact, in 
2011, as indicated, Libya scored 7 (the worst non-free score) by Freedom House and -7 (autocracy) by 
Polity IV, while in 2019, the Freedom House index was 6,5 (still not Free, with a slight improvement). 
Polity IV, 2018, did not indicate a score to Libya, classifying the country as failed/occupied.
Today, the U.N. is in close contact with the two military leaders on both sides of the conflict 
toward renewed terms for a ceasefire in Libya. Trump has joined this movement, fearing that Egypt 
would be willing to send ground troops there to impose a rout of the American ally, Khalifa Haftar, 
the leader of the National Liberation Army (The Guardian, June 2020). Moreover, Trump is at odds 
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with the belligerent situation in Libya. Two American allies in the region, Turkey, and Egypt, took 
opposite sides of the war, disputing influence in the area.
The truth of the matter is that neither the US/NATO interveners and their allies nor the FIRC 
literature considered the social-political characteristics and history of Libyan society. The poorly 
thought out interference and lack of understanding of the country’s political, societal, and religious 
cleavages cost the lives of many Libyan citizens and brought more conflict and disorder to the region. 
Today, Libya’s situation is undoubtedly one of a civil war. This provided an opportunity for foreign 
extremist groups, from which the Islamic State is the best example, to flourish and establish safe 
havens in the territory, profoundly fracturing the country. The prospects for a unifying government 
to democratize and stabilize Libya are today quite bleak.
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